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Global Convergence of Policy Gradient for Sequential
Zero-Sum Linear Quadratic Dynamic Games
Jingjing Bu Lillian J. Ratliff Mehran Mesbahi∗
Abstract
We propose projection-free sequential algorithms for linear-quadratic dynamics games. These
policy gradient based algorithms are akin to Stackelberg leadership model and can be extended to
model-free settings. We show that if the “leader” performs natural gradient descent/ascent, then
the proposed algorithm has a global sublinear convergence to the Nash equilibrium. Moreover,
if the leader adopts a quasi-Newton policy, the algorithm enjoys a global quadratic convergence.
Along the way, we examine and clarify the intricacies of adopting sequential policy updates for
LQ games, namely, issues pertaining to stabilization, indefinite cost structure, and circumventing
projection steps.
Keywords: Dynamic LQ games; stabilizing policies; sequential algorithms
1 Introduction
Linear-quadratic (LQ) dynamic and differential games exemplify situations where two players in-
fluence an underlying linear dynamics in order to respectively, minimize and maximize a given
quadratic cost on the state and the control over an infinite time-horizon.1 This LQ game setup
has a rich history in system and control theory, not only due to its wide range of applications
but also since it directly extends its popular one player twin, the celebrated linear quadratic reg-
ular (LQR) problem [Ber13, Eng05, Zha05]. LQR on the other hand, is one of the foundations of
modern system theory [Wil71, AM07]. This partially stems from the fact that the elegant anal-
ysis of minimizing a quadratic (infinite horizon) cost over an infinite dimensional function space
leads to a solution that is in the constant feedback form, that can be obtained via solving the
algebraic Riccati equation (ARE) [LR95]. As such, solving LQR and its variants have often been
approached from the perspective of exploiting the structure of ARE [BIM12]. The ARE facilitates
solving for the so-called cost-to-go (encoded by a positive semi-definite matrix), that can subse-
quently be used to characterize the optimal state feedback gain. This general point of view has
also influenced the “data-driven” approaches for solving the generic LQR problem. For instance,
in the value-iteration for reinforcement learning (RL)—e.g., Q learning—one aims to first estimate
the cost-to-go at a given time instance and through this estimate, update the state feedback gain.
In recent years, RL has witnessed major advances for wide range of decision-making problems (see,
e.g., [SHM+16,MKS+15]).
Direct policy update is another algorithmic pillar for decision-making over time. The con-
ceptual simplicity of policy optimization offers advantages in terms of computational scalability
∗The authors are with the University of Washington, Seattle, WA, 98195; Emails: {bu,ratliffl,mesbahi}@uw.edu
1We will adopt the convention of referring to the continuous time scenario as differential games. Moreover, in this
paper, we focus on infinite horizon LQ games without a discount factor.
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and potential extensions to model-free settings. As such, there is a renewed interest in analyz-
ing the classical LQR problem under the RL framework from the perspective of direct policy up-
dates [DMM+17, FGKM18]. The extension of LQR control to multiple-agent settings, i.e., LQ
dynamic and differential games, has also been explored by the game theory and optimal control
communities [BO99,VMKL17]. Two-person zero-sum LQ dynamic and differential games are par-
ticular instances of this more general setting where two players aim to optimize an objective with
directly opposing goals subject to a shared linear dynamical system. More precisely, one player
attempts to minimize the objective while the other aims to maximize it. This framework has im-
portant applications in H∞ optimal control [BB08]. In fact, as it is well-known in control theory,
the saddle point solution—i.e., a Nash equilibrium (NE)—of an infinite horizon LQ game can be
obtained via the corresponding generalized algebraic Riccati equation (GARE). As such, seeking
the NE in a zero-sum LQ dynamic game revolves around solving the GARE [SW94]. Recently,
multi-agent RL [SLZ+18, JCD+19] has also achieved impressive performance by using direct policy
gradient updates. Since LQ dynamic games have explicit solutions via the GARE, understanding
the performance of policy gradient based algorithms for LQ games could serve as a benchmark,
and providing deeper insights into theoretical guarantees of multi-agent RL in more general set-
tings [VMKL17]. In the meantime, the application of policy optimization algorithms in the game
setting proves to require more intricate analysis due to the fact that the infinite horizon cost is
undiscounted and potentially unbounded per stage. As such, it is well known that devising direct
policy iterations for undiscounted and unbounded per stage cost functions in the RL setting is
nontrivial [Ber05]. The cost structure of standard LQR, however, streamlines the design of policy
based iterations [Hew71,FGKM18,BMFM19].2 Nevertheless in policy iteration, special care has to
be exercised to ensure that the iterative policy updates are in fact stabilizing. The stabilization
issues is particularly relevant in the LQ dynamic games. Note that the policy space for LQ games is
an open set admitting a cartesian product structure. Hence, in the policy updates for LQ dynamic
games (say in the RL setting), we must guarantee that the iterates jointly stay in the open set as
otherwise the “simulator” would diverge. Recently, Zhang et al. [ZYB19], using certain assumptions
and relying on a projection step, have proposed a sequential direct policy updates with a sublinear
convergence for LQ dynamic games.
Contributions. In this paper, we first clarify the setting for discussing sequential LQ dynamic
games, particularly addressing issues pertaining to stabilization. We then propose leader-follower
type algorithms that resemble the Stackelberg leadership model [BO99]. Specifically, in the proposed
iterative algorithms for LQ games, one player is designated as a leader and the other as a follower.
We require that the leader plays natural gradient or quasi-Newton policies while the follower can
play any first-order based policies. In particular, we do not require a specific player to be the leader
as long as the algorithm can be initialized appropriately. We prove that if the leader performs a
natural gradient policy update, then the proposed leader-follower algorithm has a global sublinear
convergence and asymptotic linear convergence rate. In the meantime, if the leader adopts a quasi-
Newton policy update, the algorithm converges at a global quadratic rate. Moreover, we show
that gradient policy (respectively, natural gradient and quasi-Newton policies) has a global linear
(respectively, linear and quadratic) convergence to the optimal stabilizing feedback gains even when
the state cost matrix Q is indefinite. This result essentially extends the results on standard LQR
investigated in [FGKM18, BMFM19], where the analysis relies on the assumption of having Q ≻
0; this extension is of independent interest for various optimal control applications as well, e.g.,
2In [FGKM18,BMFM19] it has been assumed that the quadratic state cost is via a positive definite Q; this is not
“standard” as only the detectability of the pair (Q,A) and Q ⪰ 0 is required for LQR synthesis.
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control with conflicting objectives [Wil71]). Compared with the results presented in [ZYB19], the
contributions of this work include the following:
(1) We remove the “nonstandard assumption” that the NE point (K∗,L∗) satisfies Q−L⊺∗R2L∗ ≻
0.3 We note that such an assumption is not standard in the LQ literature and as such, needs
further justification beyond its algorithmic implications. In fact, in the analysis presented
in [ZYB19], it is crucial for the convergence of the algorithm to a priori know the positive
number ε > 0 for which {L ∶ Q − L⊺∗R2L∗ ⪰ εI}; moreover, one has to be able to project onto
this set.
(2) Our setting allows for larger stepsizes for the policy iteration in LQ dynamic games, greatly im-
proving its practical performance. This is facilitated by providing insights into the stabilizing
policy updates through a careful analysis of the corresponding indefinite GARE.
(3) We clarify the interplay between key concepts in control and optimization in the convergence
analysis of the proposed iterative algorithms for LQ dynamic games. This is inline with our
belief that identifying the role of concepts such stabilizability and detectability in the conver-
gence analysis of “data-guided" algorithms for decision making problems with an embedded
dynamic system is of paramount importance.
(4) We show that the quasi-Newton policy has a global quadratic convergence rate for LQ dynamic
games. This result might be of independent interest for discrete-time GARE, data-driven or
not. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed algorithm is the first iterative approach for
discrete-time GARE with a global quadratic convergence.
(5) Finally, we show that in the proposed iterative algorithms for LQ dynamic games, any player
can assume the role of the “leader" whereas in [ZYB19], it is required that the player max-
imizing the cost be designated as the leader. As such, we clarify the algorithmic source of
asymmetry in the leader-follower setup for solving this class of dynamic game problems.
2 Notation and Background
We use the symbols ≺,⪯,≻,⪰ to denote the ordering induced by the positive semidefinite (p.s.d.)
cone. Namely, A ⪰ B means that A−B is positive semidefinite. For a symmetric matrix M ∈ Rn×n,
we denote the eigenvalues in non-increasing order, i.e., λ1(M) ≤ . . . ≤ λn(M).
Let us recall relevant definitions and results from control theory. A matrix A ∈ Rn×n is Schur
if all the eigenvalues of A are inside the open unit disk of C, i.e., ρ(A) < 1 where ρ(⋅) denotes the
spectral radius. A pair (A,B) with A ∈ Rn×n and B ∈ Rn×m is stabilizable if there exists some
K ∈ Rm×n such that A −BK is Schur. A pair (C,A) is detectable if (A⊺,C⊺) is stabilizable. An
eigenvalue λ of A is (C,A)-observable if
rank(λI −A
C
) = n.
A matrixK ∈ Rm×n is stabilizing for system pair (A,B) if A−BK is Schur; it is marginally stabilizing
if ρ(A −BK) = 1. For fixed A ∈ Rn×n and Q ∈ Rn×n, the Lyapunov matrix is of the form
A⊺XA +Q −X = 0.
3It is noted that in [ZYB19] that the projection step is not generally required in implementations; however the
convergence analysis presented in [ZYB19] is based on such a projection.
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For a system pair (A,B), Q ∈ Rn and R ∈ GLn(R), the discrete algebraic Riccati equation (DARE)
is of the form
A⊺XA −X −A⊺XB(R +B⊺XB)−1B⊺XA +Q = 0.(1)
Next, we recall a result on standard linear-quadratic-regulator (LQR) control.
Theorem 2.1. If Q ⪰ 0, R ≻ 0, (A,B) is stabilizable and the spectrum of A on the unit disk
(centered at the origin) in C is (Q,A)-observable, then there exists a unique maximal solution X+
to DARE (1).4 Moreover, the infinite-horizon LQR cost is x⊺
0
X+x0 and the optimal feedback control
K∗ is stabilizing and characterized by K∗ = (R +B⊺X+B)−1B⊺X+A.
In the presentation, we shall refer a solution X0 to (1) as stabilizing if the corresponding feed-
back gain K0 = (R + B⊺X0B)−1B⊺X0A is stabilizing; a solution X0 is almost stabilizing if the
corresponding gain K0 = (R +B⊺X0B)−1B⊺X0A is marginally stabilizing.
In the sequential LQ game setup, one key difference from standard LQR is that Q may be
indefinite in the corresponding DARE. As such, the following generalization of the above theorem
becomes particularly relevant.
Theorem 2.2. Suppose that Q = Q⊺, R ≻ 0, (A,B) is stabilizable and there exists a solution X to
DARE (1). Then there exists a maximal solution X+ to DARE such that the LQR cost is given by
x⊺
0
X+x0. Moreover the optimal feedback control is given by K∗ = (R + B⊺XB)−1B⊺X+A and the
eigenvalues of A −BK∗ lie inside the closed unit disk of C.
For DAREs with an indefinite Q, we recall a theorem concerning the existence of solutions.
Theorem 2.3 (Theorem 13.1.1 in [LR95]). Suppose that (A,B) is stabilizable, R = R⊺ is invert-
ible, Q = Q⊺ (no definiteness assumption), and there exists a symmetric solution Xˆ to the matrix
inequality,
R(X) := A⊺XA +Q −X −A⊺XB(R +B⊺XB)−1B⊺XA ⪰ 0,
with R + B⊺X˜B ⪰ 0. Then there exists a maximal solution X+ to (1) such that R +B⊺X+B ≻ 0.
Moreover, all eigenvalues of A −B(R +B⊺XB)−1B⊺X+A are inside the closed unit disk.
The map RA,B,Q,R ∶ Rn×n → Rn×n will be referred as Riccati map in our analysis; we will also
suppress its dependency on system parameters A,B,Q,R. In our subsequent analysis, these system
parameters will not remain constant as the corresponding feedback gains are iteratively updated.
3 LQ Dynamic Games and some of its Analytic Properties
In this section, we review the setup of zero-sum LQ games. In particular we discuss the modified
sequential formulation of LQ games and make a few analytical observations that are of independent
interest. We note that some of these observations have only become necessary in the context of
sequential policy updates for LQ dynamic games.
4Where the notion of maximality is with respect to the p.s.d. ordering.
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3.1 Zero-sum LQ Dynamic Games
In the standard setup of LQ game, we consider a (discrete-time) linear time invariant model of the
form,
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) −B1u1(k) −B2u2(k), x(0) = x0,
where A ∈ Rn×n, B1 ∈ Rn×m1 , B2 ∈ Rn×m2 , u1(k) and u2(k) are strategies played by two players.
The cost incurred for both players is the quadratic cost
J(u1, u2, x0) = ∞∑
k=0
(⟨x(k),Qx(k)⟩ + ⟨u1(k),R1u1(k)⟩ − ⟨u2(k),R2u2(k)⟩) ,
where Q ∈ S+n, R1 ∈ S
++
m1
,R2 ∈ S++m2 , and x0 is the initial condition;
5 the underlying inner product is
denoted by ⟨⋅, ⋅⟩. In this setting, player one chooses its policy to minimize J while player two aims
to maximize it.
The players’ strategy space that we will be particularly interested in are closed-loop static linear
policies, namely, policies of the form u1(k) = Kx(k) and u2(k) = Lx(k), where K ∈ Rm1×n and
L ∈ Rm2×n. Note that the cost function is guaranteed to be finite over the set of Schur stabilizing
feedback gains,
S = {(K,L) ∈ Rm×n ×Rm×n ∶ ρ(A −B1K −B2L) < 1}.
Indeed, if (K,L) ∈ S, with initial condition x0, the cost will be given by,
J(u1, u2, x0) = x⊺0 ⎛⎝
∞
∑
j=0
[(A −B1K −B2L)⊺]j(Q +K⊺R1K −L⊺R2L)(A −B1K −B2L)j⎞⎠x0
= x⊺0Xx0,
where X solves the Lyapunov matrix equation,
(A −B1K −B2L)⊺X(A −B1K −B2L) +Q +K⊺R1K −L⊺R2L = 0.(2)
Note that (2) has a unique solution if (K,L) ∈ S. We say that a pair of strategies (K,L) is admissible
if (K,L) ∈ S.
Remark 3.1. An elegant result in H∞ control theory states that the minimax problem,
inf
u1∈ℓ2(N)
sup
u2∈ℓ2(N)
{J(u1, u2) ∣xu1,u2 ∈ ℓ2(N)},
where ℓ2(N) denotes the Banach space of all square summable sequences and xu1,u2 denotes the state
trajectory after adopting control signals u1, u2, has a unique saddle point for all initial conditions if
and only if there exists two static linear feedback gains K∗ and L∗ such u1(k) =K∗x(k) and u2(k) =
L∗x(k) satisfying the saddle point condition [Sto90]. Hence, the restriction of the optimization
process to static linear policies in the LQ game setting is without loss of generality.
5The notation S+n and S
++
n designate, respectively, n × n symmetric positive semidefinite and positive definite
matrices.
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A stabilizing Nash equilibrium for the zero-sum game is the pair of actions {u∗
1
(k), u∗
2
(k)} ={K∗x(k),L∗x(k)} such that,
J(u∗1(k), u2(k)) ≤ J(u∗1(k), u∗2(k)) ≤ J(u1(k), u∗2(k)),(3)
for all initial states x0 and all u1(k), u2(k) for which (u1(k), u∗2(k)) and (u∗1(k), u2(k)) are both
admissible pairs. We emphasize that it is important that (u1(k), u∗2(k)) and (u∗1(k), u2(k)) are
stabilizing action pairs in the inequality (3). To demonstrate this delicate situation, we denote bySπi the projection of S onto the ith coordinate, i.e.,
Sπ1 = {K ∶ ∃L such that A −B1K −B2L is Schur},Sπ2 = {L ∶ ∃K such that A −B1K −B2L is Schur},
and S
Kˆ
,S
Lˆ
as sets defined by,
S
Kˆ
= {L ∶ A −B1Kˆ −B2L is Schur},
S
Lˆ
= {K ∶ A −B2Lˆ −B1K is Schur}.
Clearly, SK∗ ⊂ Sπ2 and SL∗ ⊂ Sπ1 . This means that it is not the case that for all K ∈ Sπ1 and all
L ∈ Sπ2 , the corresponding actions u1(k) =Kx(k) and u2(k) = Lx(k) yield
J(u∗1(k), u2(k)) ≤ J(u∗1(k), u∗2(k)) ≤ J(u1(k), u∗2(k)).
This is simply due to the fact that (Kˆ,L∗) is not guaranteed to be stabilizing for all Kˆ ∈ Sπ1 .
Note that the cost function J is a function of polices K,L and initial condition x0. Since we
are interested in the Nash equilibrium independent of the initial conditions, naturally, we should
formulate cost functions for both players to reflect this independent. Indeed, this point has been
discussed in [BMFM19] where it has been argued that such a formulation is in general necessary
for the cost functions to be well defined (see details in §III [BMFM19]). The independence with
respect to initial conditions can be achieved by either sampling x0 from a distribution with full-rank
covariance [FGKM18], or choosing a spanning set {w1, . . . ,wn} ⊆ Rn [BMFM19], and defining the
value function over S as,
f(K,L) = n∑
i=1
Jwi(K,L),
where Jwi(K,L) is the cost by choosing initial state wi, u1(k) = Kx(k) and u2(k) = Lx(k). Note
that over the set S the value of function f admits a compact form,
f(K,L) = Tr(XΣ),
where Σ = ∑ni=1wiw
⊺
i and X is the solution to (2).
Behavior of f on Sc: How the cost function f behaves near the boundary ∂S is of paramount
importance in the design of iterative algorithms for LQ games. In the standard LQR problem
(corresponding to a single player case in the game setup), the cost function diverges to +∞ when
the feedback gain approaches the boundary of this set (see [BMFM19] for details). In fact, this
property guarantees stability of the obtained solution via first order iterative algorithms for suitable
choice of stepsize. However, the behavior of f on the boundary ∂S could be more intricate. For
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example, if (K,L) ∈ ∂S, i.e., ρ(A−B1K −B2L) = 1, then it is possible that the cost is still finite for
both players. This happens when an eigenvalue of A −B1K −B2L on the unit disk in the complex
plane is not (Q +K⊺R1K − L⊺R2L,A − B1K −B2L)-observable. To see this, we observe that for
every ωi, the series
∞
∑
j=0
Jωi(K,L) = ω⊺i ⎛⎝
∞
∑
j=0
((A −B1K −B2L)⊺)j(Q +K⊺R1K −L⊺R2L)(A −B1K −B2L)j⎞⎠ωi
is convergent to a finite (real) number if the marginally stable modes are not detectable. Even onS¯c (complement of closure of S), f could be finite if all the non-stable modes of (A−B2K−B2L) are
not (Q+K⊺R1K−L⊺R2L,A−B1K−B2L)-observable. The complication suggests that the function
value is no longer a valid indictor of stability. We remark that such a situation does not occur in the
LQ setting examined in [FGKM18,BMFM19], as it has been assumed that Q is positive definite.
3.2 Stabilizing Policies in Sequential Zero-Sum LQ Games
Another subtle situation arising in sequential zero-sum LQ dynamic game is as follows: there is
clearly no incentive for player 1 to destabilize the dynamics. However, from the perspective of
player 2, making the states diverge to infinity could be desirable as the player aims to maximize the
cost. For player 1, in the situation where Q −L⊺R2L is not positive semidefinite, it is also possible
that the best policy is not the one in Sπ1 . Hence, in round j, in order to guarantee that the game
can be continued, it is important that both players choose their respective policies in Sπ1 and Sπ2 .
We may then stipulate that both players play Schur stable policies. We can justify this constraint
by insisting that both players have an incentive to stabilize the system in the first place. This can
also be encoded in the cost function for the player. That is, we may define the cost functions for
player 1 and player 2 by,
f1(K,L) = δSpi1 (K) + f(K,L),
f2(K,L) = −δSpi2 (L) + f(K,L),
where δSpii (x) is the indicator function of the set
δSpii (x) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
0, x ∈ Sπi ,+∞, x ∉ Sπi .
Then we have two cost functions defined everywhere for both players and assume a finite value onS which agree with each other, i.e., f(K,L). We still need to be careful in realizing that there are
points for which the function value is indeterminate. For example, it is possible to find a point (Kˆ, Lˆ)
such that f(Kˆ, Lˆ) = −∞; then f1(Kˆ, Lˆ) = +∞ −∞. To resolve this complication, we shall declare
the function value to be the first summand; namely, if f1(Kˆ, Lˆ) = +∞−∞, then f1(Kˆ, Lˆ) ≡ +∞.
From the perspective of sequential algorithm design, these newly introduced cost functions
would constrain both players to play policies in S. It might be tempting to design projection based
algorithms. However, this can be difficult since describing the sets Sπ1 and Sπ2 for given system(A,B) is not straightforward. We shall see later that by exploiting the problem structure, we can
design sequential algorithms for both players to guarantee this condition without any projection
step.
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3.3 Analytic Properties of the Cost Function
In this section we shall clarify analytical properties of the cost functions in terms of the polices
played by the two players; that is, we consider the cost function f(K,L) over S.6 To begin with,
we observe the set S even though is not convex, still possesses nice topological properties.
Proposition 3.2. The set S is open, contractible (i.e., path-connected and simply connected) and
in general non-convex.
Proof. It suffices to note that by Kalman Decomposition [Won12], there exists some T ∈ GLn(R)
such that,
TAT −1 =
⎛⎝A˜11 A˜120 A˜22⎞⎠ , T [B1,B2] = (B˜10 ) ,
where (A˜11, B˜1) is controllable and A˜22 is Schur. Suppose that B˜1 ∈ Rn1×(l1+l2) and further observe
that S can be diffeomorphically identified by S(A˜11,B˜1) ×R(n−n1)×(l1+l2). The statement then follows
by the results reported in [BMM19].
As the set S is generally not convex, Proposition 3.2 assures us that algorithms based on local
search (e.g. gradient descent) can potentially reach the Nash equilibrium. If S had more than one
path-connected components, it will be impossible to guarantee the convergence to Nash equilibrium
under random initialization. Moreover this observation implies that f is not convex-concave as the
domain is not even convex.
We next observe that the value function is smooth and indeed real analytic, i.e., f ∈ Cω(S).
Proposition 3.3. One has f ∈ Cω(S).
Proof. For (K,L) ∈ S, f is the composition
(K,L) ↦X(K,L) ↦ Tr(XΣ),
where X solves (2). But
vec(X) = (I ⊗ I −A⊺K,L ⊗A⊺K,L)−1 vec(Q +K⊺R1K −L⊺R2L),
by Cramer’s Rule; the proof thus follows.
As f is smooth, its partial derivatives with respect to K and L can be characterized as follows.
Proposition 3.4. On the set S, the gradients of f with respect to its arguments are given by,
∂Kf(K,L) = (R1K −B⊺1XAK,L)Y,
∂Lf(K,L) = (−R2L −B⊺2XAK,L)Y,
where X solves the Lyapunov equation (2) and Y solves the Lyapunov equation,
AK,LY A
⊺
K,L +Σ = 0.(4)
6In our formulation, the two players have different cost functions. But over the set S, the cost functions coincide.
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Proof. It suffices to rewrite the Lyapunov equation in the form
⎛⎝A − (B1 B2)(KL)⎞⎠
⊺
X
⎛⎝A − (B1 B2)(KL)⎞⎠ −X +Q + (KL)
⊺ (R1 0
0 −R2)(KL) = 0.
By the result in [FGKM18,BMFM19], the gradient of f is given by
∇f(K,L) = ( (R1K −B⊺1XAK,L)Y(−R2K −B⊺1XAK,L)Y ) .
We now observe that Y (K,L) is a smooth function in (K,L) and is positive definite everywhere
on S. Hence Y (K,L) is a well-defined Riemannian metric on S. Under this Riemannian metric, we
can thereby identify the gradient. In learning and statistics literature, such a gradient is referred as
a “natural gradient.” We shall use Nf,K and Nf,L to denote the natural gradient of f over K and
L, respectively. Namely,
Nf,K(K,L) = R1K −B⊺1XAK,L,
Nf,L(K,L) = −R2L −B⊺2XAK,L.
3.4 A Key Assumption and its Implications
Throughout the manuscript, we have the following standing assumption.
Assumption 1. There exists a stabilizing Nash Equilibrium (K∗,L∗) ∈ S for the zero-sum game
over the system dynamic (A, [B1,B2]). Moreover, the corresponding value matrix X∗ =X∗(K∗,L∗)
satisfies at least one of the following conditions:
(a1): R1 +B⊺1X∗B1 ≻ 0 and R2 −B⊺2X∗B2 +B⊺2X∗(R1 +B⊺1X∗B1)−1B1B2 ≻ 0.
(a2): −R2 +B⊺2X∗B1 ≺ 0 and R1 +B⊺1X∗B1 −B⊺1X∗B2(−R2 +B⊺2X∗B2)−1B⊺2X∗B1 ≻ 0.
Remark 3.5. The existence of a stabilizing Nash is a necessary assumption adopted in the LQ
literature [BB08]. However, we do not constrain the value matrix X∗ to be positive semidefinite,
as assumed in [SW94,BB08,ZYB19]. The definiteness is useful when the LQ game formulation is
tied to H∞ control. However, from the LQ game perspective, this association seems unnecessary.
Conditions (a1) or (a2) are necessary if it is desired to extract unique policies from the optimal
value matrix X∗. Namely, if the total derivative of f vanishes, i.e.,
(R1 0
0 −R2)(KL) − (B⊺1B⊺2)XA + (B
⊺
1
B⊺
2
)X (B1 B2) = 0,
conditions (a1) or (a2) are sufficient to guarantee the uniqueness of the solution in S. Indeed,
assumptions (a1) or (a2) are “almost necessary.” If (K∗,L∗) is a NE, then f(⋅,L∗) achieves a local
minimum at K∗, i.e., ∇KKf(K∗,L∗)[E,E] = ⟨E, (R1+B⊺1X∗B1)EY∗⟩ ≥ 0 (note that by assumption,
K∗ is in the interior of S and thus the second-order partial derivative is well-defined). Similarly,∇LLf(K∗,L∗) = −R2 + B⊺2X∗B2 ⪯ 0. We relax these two necessary conditions to hold as strictly
positive (respectively, negative) definite.7 In fact, in the sequential LQ formulation, the inequalities
7If we do not relax the semidefiniteness conditions, the NE would be solutions to GARE involving Moore-Penrose
inverse. This will introduce other complications than practically needed.
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in these two conditions correspond to certain “quasi-Newton” directions and as such play a central
role in our convergence analysis (see §5 and §6 for details.).
Moreover, we shall subsequently see that assumptions (a1) and (a2) lead to distinct choices of
leaders in the sequential algorithms. More specifically, if we assume condition (a1), the leader of
the sequential algorithm should be player L; for assumption (a2), player K should be the designated
leader.
We observe several implications of this assumption.
Proposition 3.6. Under Assumption 1, we have following implications:
a. The pair (A, [B1,B2]) is stabilizable.
b. X∗ is symmetric and solves the Generalized Algebraic Riccati Equation (GARE),
A⊺XA −X +Q + (B⊺1XA
B⊺
2
XA
)⊺ (R1 +B⊺1XB1 B⊺1XB2
B⊺
2
XB1 −R2 +B⊺2XB2)
−1 (B⊺1XA
B⊺
2
XA
) = 0.(5)
c. X∗ is unique among all almost stabilizing solutions of (5).
Proof. The statement in (a) is immediate since A −B1K∗ −B2L∗ is Schur.
In order to show (b), we note that since (K∗,L∗) is a stabilizing Nash Equilibrium, then X∗ is the
solution of the Lyapunov equation (2); it thus follows that X∗ is symmetric. Further, note that the
partial gradients of f vanish at (K∗,L∗), namely (K∗,L∗) ∈ S solves the equations
∇Kf(K,L) = (R1K −B⊺1XAK,L)Y = 0,∇Lf(K,L) = (−R2L −B⊺2XAK,L)Y = 0.
Substituting this in the Lyapunov equation (2), it follows that (K∗,L∗) solves the GARE (5). Note
that the inverse,
(R1 +B⊺1XB1 B⊺1XB2
B⊺
2
XB1 −R2 +B⊺2XB2)
−1
is well-defined at X∗ by the conditions a1 or a2 in the assumption.
For the statement in (c), by Lemma 3.1 [SW94], X∗ is the unique stabilizing solution. It remains
to show that there does not exist almost stabilizing solution to (5). Suppose there exists a pair(K,L) ∈ ∂S, i.e., ρ(A −B1K −B2L) = 1, solving (5) with solution X. Then taking the difference
between the identity (5) at (K∗,L∗) and (K,L), we have,
A⊺∗(X∗ −X)AK,L =X∗ −X.
Since AK,L is marginally stable and A∗ is stable, then I ⊗ I − A⊺K,L ⊗ A∗ is invertible and thus
X∗ −X = 0.
4 Oracle Models for Sequential LQ Games
In this work, we assume that both players have access to oracles that return either gradient, natural
gradient or quasi-Newton directions. Suppose that OK and OL are the orcales for the two players
respectively. The players will query their respective oracles in a sequential manner: if player 1
query the oracle, we assume the policy played by player 2 is fixed during the query and this policy
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is transparent to oracle OK of player 1. As f is in general not convex-concave, if two players have the
same oracles and play greedily using the information they have acquired, theoretically, there is no
guarantee that they will eventually converge to the Nash equilibrium. In order to obtain theoretical
guarantees, we assume that player 1 can access an oracle that computes the minimizer of f(K,L)
overK for a fixed L. This oracle can be constructed out of the simple first-order oracles by repeatedly
performing gradient descent/natural gradient descent/quasi-Newton type steps. More explicitly, we
shall assume that for player 1, if player 2’s policy is Lˆ, the oracle can return K ← argminK f(K, Lˆ).
4.1 Motivation
We shall present the motivation for equipping player 1 with a more powerful oracle model. As finding
the Nash equilibrium is equivalent to solving the saddle point of f(K,L), from the perspective of
player 2, we may associate a value function independent of player 1. Namely, we may define a
function of the form,
g(L) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
infK∈SL f(K,L), if L ∈ Sπ2 ,−∞, otherwise.
If g(L) possesses a smoothness property, we may consider projected gradient ascent over the policy
space. However, reflecting over g(L) would reveal that g(L) is not necessarily even continuous onSπ2 . For example, if Q − L⊺R2L ≺ 0, then infK f(K,L) could be −∞. But on the other hand, by
Danskin’s Theorem, g(L) is differentiable at L ∈ Sπ2 , where f(K,L) admits a unique minimizer
over K.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose that U ⊆ dom(g) is an open subset such that for every L ∈ U ,
argmin
K∈SL
f(K,L)
exits and is unique. Then g(L) is differentiable and its gradient is,
∇g(L) = ∇Lf(KL,L), where KL = argmin
K
f(K,L).
Traditionally Danskin’s theorem would require that for every L, the minimization of K is over a
common compact set. This is not the situation in our case as SL is not compact nor common over
L8. The statement of Lemma 4.1 instead follows from a variant of Danskin’s Theorem in [BR95].
Proof. We only need to observe that f(K,L) is C∞ in both variables and thus Fréchet differentiable.
Hence, the assumptions of Hypothesis D2 in [BR95] are satisfied. By Theorem D2 in [BR95], g(L)
is directionally differentiable in every direction. As the minimizer KL is unique, the directional
derivative is uniform in every direction and consequently, g(L) is differentiable.
The next issue that needs to be addressed is whether U is empty. It turns out that by standard
LQR theory, {L ∈ dom(g) ∶ Q − L⊺R2L ≻ 0} is a subset in U . We can thus outline an update rule
assuming that g(L) is Lipschitz, namely, a projected gradient ascent over L as,
Lj+1 = PSpi2 (Lj + ηj∇g(Lj)) ,
8Namely, it is not necessarily true SL1 = SL2 if L1 ≠ L2.
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where ∇g(Lj) is given by
∇g(Lj) = (−R2L −BT2 XKLj ,LjAKLj ,Lj)YKLj ,Lj with KLj = argmin
K
f(K,Lj).
As already noted, we do not have a full description of the nonconvex set Sπ2 and a projection
would rather be prohibitive. What we shall propose instead, are update rules that guarantee all
of its iterates stay in the set Sπ2 ; this will be achieved without a projection step by exploiting the
problem structure.
Another interesting interpretation of our setup is to consider this game from the perspective of
player 2: we have a game played by player 2 with a greedy adversary. Each time player 2 chooses
a policy L′, the adversary (player 1) would try to act greedily, i.e., minimize the cost f(K,L′)
over K. The goal for player 2 is to achieve the Nash equilibrium point for himself/herself and the
greedy adversary. The information player 2 can acquire from the game (i.e., oracle) is the first-order
information (function value and gradient). As such, player 2 has an obligation to guarantee that
along the iterates {Lj}, the oracle could return meaningful first-order information of g(L), i.e.,
g(Lj) is differentiable for every j.
5 Algorithm: Natural Gradient Policy on L
Throughout §5 and §6, we assume that condition (a1) in our assumption holds, i.e.,
R1 +B⊺1X∗B1 ≻ 0,−R2 +B⊺2X∗B2 +B⊺2X∗B1(R1 +B⊺1X∗B1)−1B⊺1X∗B2 ≺ 0,
and an oracle OK that returns the stabilizing minimizer f(K,L) for any fixed L, provided that such
minimizer exists. Note that the unique minimizer corresponds to the maximal solution X+ to the
algebraic Riccati equation (with fixed L), namely,
(A −B2L)⊺X(A −B2L) −X +Q −L⊺R2L − (A −B2L)⊺XB1(R +B⊺1XB1)−1B⊺1X(A −B2L) = 0.
We shall subsequently discuss how to construct this oracle by policy gradient based algorithms in
§7.
5.1 Algorithm
The algorithm is given by:
Algorithm 1 Natural Gradient Policy for LQ Game
1: Initialize L0 such that (A −B1L0,B2) is stabilizable and the DARE
(A −B2L0)⊺X(A −B2L0) −X +Q −L⊺0R2L0 − (A −B2L0)⊺XB1(R1 +B⊺1XB1)B⊺1X(A −B2L0) = 0
has a stabilizing solution X+ with R1 +B⊺1X+B1 ≻ 0.
2: if j ≥ 1 then
3: Set: Kj−1 ← argminK f(K,Lj−1).
4: Set: Lj = Lj−1 + ηjNg(Lj) ≡ Lj−1 + ηjNf,L(Kj−1,Lj−1).
5: end if
We note that the initialization step is generally nontrivial. However, if we further assume that(A,B1) is stabilizable, Q ⪰ 0 and those eigenvalues of A lying on the unit disk are (Q,A)-detectable,
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then we can choose L0 = 09. For the general case, we may need to check invariant subspaces of
system parameters (see [LR95] for details.)
5.2 Convergence Analysis
To simplify the notation let,
UK,L = R1K −B⊺XK,LAK,L, VK,L = −R2L −B⊺XK,LAK,L;
namely 2UK,L = Nf,K(K,L) and 2VK,L = Nf,L(K,L). First a useful observation.
Lemma 5.1 (NG Comparison Lemma). Suppose that (K,L) and (Kˆ, Lˆ) are both stabilizing and
let X and Xˆ be the corresponding value matrices. Then
a.
X − Xˆ = A⊺
Kˆ,Lˆ
(X − Xˆ)A
Kˆ,Lˆ
+ (K − Kˆ)⊺UK,L +U⊺K,L(K − Kˆ) − (K − Kˆ)⊺R1(K − Kˆ)
+(L − Lˆ)⊺VK,L +V⊺K,L(L − Lˆ) + (L − Lˆ)⊺R2(L − Lˆ) − (AK,L −AKˆ,Lˆ)⊺X(AK,L −AKˆ,Lˆ).
b.
X − Xˆ = A⊺K,L(X − Xˆ)AK,L + (K − Kˆ)⊺UKˆ,Lˆ +U⊺Kˆ,Lˆ(K − Kˆ) + (K − Kˆ)⊺R1(K − Kˆ)
+(L − Lˆ)⊺V
Kˆ,Lˆ
+V⊺
Kˆ,Lˆ
(L − Lˆ) − (L − Lˆ)⊺R2(L − Lˆ) + (AK,L −AKˆ,Lˆ)⊺Xˆ(AK,L −AKˆ,Lˆ).
Remark 5.2. Item (b) of this lemma was observed in [ZYB19]. Our presentation offers a control
theoretic perspective on its proof.
Proof. We prove item (a); item (b) can be proved in a similar manner.
It suffices to take the difference of the Lyapunov equations:
A⊺K,LXAK,L +Q +K⊺R1K −L⊺R2L =X,
A⊺
Kˆ,Lˆ
XˆA
Kˆ,Lˆ
+Q + Kˆ⊺R1Kˆ − Lˆ⊺R2Lˆ = Xˆ.
Indeed, a few algebraic operations reveal that
X − Xˆ = A⊺
Kˆ,Lˆ
(X − Xˆ)A
Kˆ,Lˆ
+ (K − Kˆ)⊺UK,L +U⊺K,L(K − Kˆ) − (K − Kˆ)⊺(R1)(K − Kˆ)
+ (L − Lˆ)⊺VK,L +V⊺K,L(L − Lˆ) + (L − Lˆ)⊺R2(L − Lˆ) − (AK,L −AKˆ,Lˆ)⊺X(AK,L −AKˆ,Lˆ).
We now observe another version of comparison lemma when L, L˜ ∈ dom(g). Indeed, this lemma
will play a more prominent role in our convergence analysis.
Lemma 5.3 (Comparison Lemma 2). Suppose that L, L˜ ∈ dom(g), namely there exists K,K˜ such
that
K = argmin
K ′∈SL
f(K ′,L), K˜ = argmin
K ′∈S
L˜
f(K ′, L˜).
9This is indeed the standard assumption in the LQ literature.
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Further, suppose that the algebraic Riccati map RA−B2L,B1,Q−L⊺R2L,R1(X˜) is well-defined, i.e., R1 +
B⊺
1
X˜B1 is invertible. Recall that the Riccati map is given by,
RA−B2L,B1,Q−L⊺R2L,R1(X˜) = (A −B2L)⊺X˜(A −B2L) − X˜ +Q −L⊺R2L
− (A −B2L)⊺X˜B1(R1 +B⊺1 X˜B1)−1B⊺1 X˜(A −B2L).
Let X and X˜ be the corresponding value matrix. Putting
E := R1 +B⊺1 X˜B1, F := B⊺1 X˜(A −B2L),
then
X − X˜ = A⊺K,L(X − X˜)AK,L +RA−B2L,B1,Q−L⊺R2L,R1(X˜) + (EK −F)⊺E−1(EK −F).
Moreover,
RA−B2L,B1,Q−L⊺R2L,R1 = (L − L˜)⊺VK˜,L˜ +V⊺K˜,L˜(L − L˜) − (L − L˜)⊺OX˜(L − L˜),
where
OX˜ := R2 −B⊺2 X˜B2 +B⊺2 X˜B1(R1 +B⊺1 X˜B1)−1B⊺1 X˜B2.
Proof. Note that X solves the Lyapunov matrix equation,
X = (A −B1K −B2L)⊺X(A −B1K −B2L) +Q −L⊺R2L +K⊺R1K,
with K = (R1 +B⊺1XB1)−1B⊺1X(A −B2L). Then
X − X˜ −A⊺K,L(X − X˜)AK,L = A⊺K,LX˜AK,L − X˜ +Q −L⊺R2L +K⊺R1K
= (A −B2L)⊺X˜(A −B2L) − X˜ +Q −L⊺R2L +K⊺(R1 +B⊺1 X˜B1)K
−K⊺B⊺1 X˜(A −B2L) − (A −B2L)⊺X˜B1K
=RA−B2L,B1,Q−L⊺R2L,R1(X˜)
+ (A −B2L)⊺X˜B1(R1 +B⊺1 X˜B1)−1B⊺1 X˜(A −B2L)
+K⊺(R1 +B⊺1 X˜B1)K −K⊺B⊺1 X˜(A −B2L) − (A −B2L)⊺X˜B1K
=RA−B2L,B1,Q−L⊺R2L,R1(X˜) + (EK −F)⊺E−1(EK −F).
Since X˜ satisfies the algebraic Riccati equation
(A −B2L˜)⊺X˜(A −B2L˜) +Q − L˜⊺R2L˜ − (A −B2L˜)⊺X˜B1(R1 +B⊺1 X˜B1)−1B⊺1 X˜(A −B2L˜) = X˜,
it follows that,
RA−B2L,B1,Q−L⊺R2L,R1(X˜) = (A −B2L)⊺X˜(A −B2L) −L⊺R2L
− (A −B2L)⊺X˜B1(R1 +B⊺1 X˜B1)−1B⊺1 X˜(A −B2L)
− (A −B2L˜)⊺X˜(A −B2L˜) + L˜⊺R2L˜
+ (A −B2L˜)⊺X˜B1(R1 +B⊺1 X˜B1)−1B⊺1 X˜(A −B2L˜)
= (L − L˜)⊺(−R2L˜ −B⊺2 X˜AK˜,L˜) + (−R2L˜ −B⊺2 X˜AX˜,L˜)⊺(L − L˜)
− (L − L˜)⊺(R2 −B⊺2 X˜B2 +B⊺2 X˜B1(R1 +B⊺1 X˜B1)−1B⊺1 X˜B2)(L − L˜).
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Let us now prove the convergence of the proposed algorithm. In the following analysis, Kj ’s
are exclusively used as the unique stabilizing minimizers,10 for f(K,Lj) over K.11 To simplify the
notation, let
∆ :=XKj−1,Lj−1 ,
Oj−1 := R2 −B⊺2XKj−1,Lj−1B2 +B⊺2XKj−1,Lj−1B1(R1 +B⊺1XKj−1,Lj−1B1)−1B⊺1XKj−1,Lj−1B2.
We shall first show that if Algorithm 1 is initialized appropriately, then with stepsize
ηj−1 <
1
λn(Oj−1) ,
Algorithm 1 generates a sequence {Lj} satisfying properties listed in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.4. Suppose that Algorithm 1 is initialized appropriately. With stepsize ηj−1 ≤ 1λn(Oj−1) ,
we then have,
a. (A −B2Lj,B1) is stabilizable for every j ≥ 1.
b. Oj ≻ 0 for every j ≥ 1.
c. For every j ≥ 1, f(K,Lj) is bounded below over K and there exists a unique minimizer Kj,
which forms a stabilizing pair (Kj ,Lj). Namely, the DARE
0 = (A −B2Lj)⊺X(A −B2Lj) −X
+Q −L⊺jR2Lj − (A −B2Lj)⊺XB1(R1 +B⊺1XB1)−1B⊺1X(A −B2Lj),(6)
admits a stabilizing maximal solution X+ satisfying R +B⊺
1
X+B1 ≻ 0.
d. Putting Λ =XKj ,Lj , Ej = R1 +B⊺1XKj ,LjB1 and Fj = B⊺1XKj ,Lj(A −B2Lj) we have
Λ −∆ = A⊺Kj ,Lj(Λ −∆)AKj ,Lj +V⊺Kj−1,Lj−1 (4ηj−1I − 4η2jOj−1)VKj−1,Lj−1
+ (Ej−1Kj −Fj−1)−1E−1j−1(Ej−1Kj −Fj−1).
Proof. It suffices to prove the lemma by induction since all items holds at j = 0 (by initialization of
the algorithm). We shall first suppose that (A−B2Lj,B1) is stabilizable, i.e., (a) holds. Note that
this property is not automatically guaranteed and we subsequently provide an analysis to carefully
remove this assumption.12
First note that by our assumption, ∆ is the maximal stabilizing solution of the DARE,13
0 = (A −B2Lj−1)⊺X(A −B2Lj−1) −X
+Q −L⊺j−1R2Lj−1 − (A −B2Lj−1)⊺XB1(R1 +B⊺1XB1)−1B⊺1X(A −B2Lj−1),
10Depending on the structure of our problem, it is possible that there exists non-stabilizing minimizers. But here
we are only concerned with minimizers in the set S.
11Of course, we need to guarantee that for Lj , there exists a unique minimizer.
12A side remark on our proof strategy: in linear system theory, a number of synthesis results are developed under
the assumption of stabilizability of the system. We will utilize these observations here; however, to use those tools, we
must assume that (A−B2Lj ,B1) is stabilizable. But this is also one of our goals to show. The reader might recognize
certain circular line of reasoning here. Indeed, one of our contributions is pseudo trick devised to circumvent this
issue: we first assume stabilizability and then use the results developed to arrive at a contradiction if the system had
not been stabilizable.
13This can be considered as an LQR problem for system (A −B2Lj−1,B1) with state cost matrix Q−L
⊺
j−1R2Lj−1.
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and Kj−1 = (R1 +B⊺1∆B1)−1B⊺1∆(A −B2Lj−1). Now adopt the update rule,
Lj = Lj−1 − ηj−1Ng(Lj−1) = Lj−1 − 2ηj−1VKj−1,Lj−1 .
by Lemma 5.3 it follows
RA−B2Lj ,B1,Q−L⊺jR2Lj ,R1(Xj−1) =V⊺Kj−1,Lj−1 (4ηj−1I − 4η2j−1Oj−1))VKj−1,Lj−1 .(7)
Thereby with the stepsize ηj−1 ≤ 1λn(O) , we have
RA−B2Lj ,B1,Q−L⊺jR2Lj ,R1(Xj−1) =VKj−1,Lj−1 (4ηj−1I − 4η2j−1Oj−1)VKj−1,Lj−1 ⪰ 0.(8)
By Theorem 2.3 (note that the inequality (8) is crucial for applying the theorem), there exists a
maximal solution X+ ⪰∆ to the DARE (6) and moreover, with
K+ = (R1 +B⊺1X+B1)−1B⊺1X+(A −B2Lj),
the eigenvalues of A −B2Lj −B1K+ are in the closed unit disk of C. Equivalently, X+ solves the
following Lyapunov equation,
(A −B1K+ −B2Lj)⊺X+(A −B1K+ −B2Lj) +Q + (K+)⊺R1K+ −L⊺jR2Lj =X+.
Item (d) thereby follows from the first part of Lemma 5.3. We now observe that K+ is indeed
stabilizing. Suppose that this is not the case; then there exists v ∈ Cn such that (A−B2Lj−B1K+)v =
λv with ∣λ∣ = 1. Hence,
v⊺ (A⊺K+,Lj(X+ −∆)AK+,Lj)v + v⊺ (V⊺Kj−1,Lj−1 (4ηj−1I − 4η2jOj−1)VKj−1,Lj−1)v
≤ v⊺(X+ −∆)v.
This would imply that VKj−1,Lj−1v = 0. But this means that,
Ljv = Lj−1v.(9)
By Lemma 5.1, we have
A⊺K+,Lj(X+ −∆)AK+,Lj − (X+ −∆) +V⊺Kj−1,Lj−1 (4ηj−1I − 4η2jR2)VKj−1,Lj−1
+(K+ −Kj−1)⊺R1(K+ −Kj−1) + (AK+,Lj −AKj−1,Lj−1)⊺∆(AK+,Lj −AKj−1,Lj−1) = 0.
Multiplying v⊺ and v on each side and combining the resulting expression with (9), we obtain,
Kj−1v =K+v.
But now we have
(A −B1Kj−1 −B2Lj−1)v = Av −B1K+v −B2Ljv = λv.
This is a contradiction to the Schur stability of (Kj−1,Lj−1). For item (b), note that Xj ⪯ X∗, so
R2 −B⊺2XjB2 ≻ 0 and consequently Oj ≻ 0 as R1 +B⊺1XjB1 ⪰ R1 +B⊺1Xj−1B1 ≻ 0. Hence, we have
completed the proof for items (b), (c), (d) under the assumption of item (a).
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We now argue that with the stepsize ηj−1 ≤ 1/λn(Oj−1), this assumption of stabilizability is
indeed valid; namely, item (a) holds. Consider the ray {Lt ∶ Lt = Lj−1+ t2VKj−1,Lj−1}. We first note
that there exists a maximal half-open interval [0, σ) such that (A−B2Lt,B1) is stabilizable for every
t ∈ [0, σ) and (A−B2Lσ,B1) is not stabilizable (this is due to the fact that stabilizability is an open
condition; see Proposition C.1 for a proof). Now suppose that σ < 1
λn(Oj−1)
. We may take a sequence
tl ↑ σ, and note that (A − B2Ltl ,B1) is stabilizable for every tl. Let us denote the corresponding
sequence of solutions to the DARE by {Ztl}. By our previous arguments, ∆ ⪯ Ztl ⪯ X∗, where
X∗ is the corresponding value matrix at Nash equilibrium point (K∗,L∗). Denote by L as the set
of all limit points of the sequence {Ztl}∞l=1. By Weirestrass-Balzano, the set L is nonempty as the
sequence is bounded. Clearly, for every Z ∈ L, ∆ ⪯ Z ⪯X∗. By continuity, Z must solve the DARE,
(A −B2Lσ)⊺X(A −B2Lσ) +Q −L⊺σR2Lσ − (A −B2Lσ)⊺XB1(R1 +B⊺1XB1)−1B⊺1X(A −B2Lσ) =X.(10)
Putting K ′ = (R1 + B⊺1ZB1)−1B⊺1Z(A − B2Lj), we claim that A − B2Lσ − B1K ′ is Schur stable.
This is a consequence of (d) and the Comparison Lemma 5.1: it suffices to observe that AK ′,Lσ is
marginally stable satisfying (d) and,
A⊺K ′,Lσ(Z −∆)AK ′,Lσ − (Z −∆) +V⊺Kj−1,Lj−1 (4σI − 4σ2Oj−1)VKj−1,Lj−1 ⪯ 0.
Proceeding similar to the above line of reasoning, we can show that A−B2Lσ−B1K ′ is Schur stable.
But this contradicts our standing assumption that (A−B2Lσ,B1) is not stabilizable. Hence, for all
ηj−1 ≤ 1/λn(Oj−1), the pair (A −B2Lj ,B1) is indeed stabilizable.
We are now ready to state the convergence rate for the algorithm.
Theorem 5.5. If the stepsize is taken as ηj = 1/(2λn(Oj−1)), then,
∞
∑
j=0
∥Ng(Lj)∥2F ≤ 1η (g(L∗) − g(L0)) ,
where η ∈ R+ is some positive constant.
Remark 5.6. This theorem suggests the gradient will vanish at a sublinear rate. As we know, there
is a unique stationary point of g; this means the sublinear convergence to global maximum, i.e.,
Nash equilibrium point.
Proof. Let η = infj 1/λn(Oj) and note that Oj ⪰ R2 −B⊺2X∗B2, so η > 0. It suffices to note that by
Lemma 5.4, we have
g(Lj) − g(Lj−1) = Tr((XKj ,Lj −XKj−1,Lj−1)Σ)
≥
1
λn(Oj−1) Tr [YKj ,Lj (Ng(Lj−1)⊺Ng(Lj−1))]
≥ η∥Ng(Lj−1)∥2F .
Telescoping the sum and noting that g(L) is bounded above by g(L∗), we have
∞
∑
j=0
∥Ng(Lj)∥2F ≤ 1η (g(L∗) − g(L0)) <∞.
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We observe that the convergence rate is asymptotically linear. This is a consequence of the
local curvature of g(L). Indeed, if we compute the Hessian at g(L∗), the action of the Hessian (see
Appendix A for details) is given by
∇2g(L∗)[E,E] = −2⟨OX∗E,EY∗⟩.
As ∇2g(L∗) is negative definite, −g(L) is locally strongly convex around a convex neighborhood of
L∗. It thus follows that gradient descent enjoys a linear convergence rate around L∗.
6 Algorithm: quasi-Newton Iterations of L
In this section, we shall assume that the oracle OL returns the quasi-Newton direction. The moti-
vation of quasi-Newton is to investigate the second-order local approximation of g(L). Indeed, we
may observe that,
g(L +∆L) ≈ g(L) + 2⟨YL+∆LNg(L),∆L⟩ − ⟨OL∆L,∆L⟩.
Algorithm 2 quasi-Newton Policy for LQ Game
1: Initialize (K0,L0) ∈ S such that (Q −L⊺0R2L0,A −B2L0) is detectable and the DARE
(A −B2L0)⊺X(A −B2L0) −X +Q −L⊺0R2L0 + (A −B2L0)⊺XB1(R1 +B⊺1XB1)B⊺1X(A −B2L0)
is solvable in SL0 ≡ {K ∈ Rm1×n ∶ A −B2L0 −B1K is Schur}.
2: if j ≥ 1 then
3: Set: Kj ← argminK f(K,Lj−1).
4: Set: Lj = Lj−1 + ηj−1O−1j−12(−R2Lj−1 −B⊺2XKj−1,Lj−1AKj−1,Lj−1).
5: end if
6.1 Convergence Analysis
We first prove a result that can be considered as a counterpart to Lemma 5.4.
Lemma 6.1. Suppose that Algorithm 2 is initialized appropriately. With stepsize ηj−1 ≤ 1λn(Oj−1) ,
we then have,
a. (A −B2Lj,B1) is stabilizable for every j ≥ 1.
b. Oj ≻ 0 for every j ≥ 1.
c. For every j ≥ 1, f(K,Lj) is bounded below over K and there exists a unique minimizer Kj,
which forms a stabilizing pair (Kj ,Lj). Namely, the DARE
(A −B2Lj)⊺X(A −B2Lj) +Q −L⊺jR2Lj − (A −B2Lj)⊺XB1(R1 +B⊺1XB1)−1B⊺1X(A −B2Lj) =X,
admits a stabilizing maximal solution X+ satisfying R +B⊺
1
X+B1 ≻ 0.
d. Putting Λ =XKj ,Lj , Ej = R1 +B⊺1XKj ,LjB1 and Fj = B⊺1XKj ,Lj(A −B2Lj) we have
Λ −∆ = A⊺Kj ,Lj(Λ −∆)AKj ,Lj +V⊺Kj−1,Lj−1 (4ηj−1O−1j−1 − 4η2jO−1j−1)VKj−1,Lj−1
+ (Ej−1Kj −Fj−1)⊺E−1j−1(Ej−1Kj −Fj−1).
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Proof. The proof proceeds similar to Lemma 5.4. The key difference is that the algebraic Riccati
map assumes a new form with the quasi-Newton update. Namely, with quasi-Newton iteration,
RA−B2Lj ,B1,Q−L⊺jR2Lj ,R1(Xj−1) = (4ηj−1I − 4η2j−1)V⊺Kj−1,Lj−1O−1j−1VKj−1,Lj−1 .
The statements then follows from almost same arguments as in Lemma 5.4.
We are now ready to state the convergence rate for the algorithm.
Theorem 6.2. If the stepsize is taken as η = 1/2, then
g(L∗) − g(Lj) ≤ q(g(L∗) − g(Lj−1))2,
for some q > 0.
Proof. By Lemma 6.1, the sequence of value matrices {Xj} is monotonically nondecreasing and
bounded above. Thereby Xj → X∗ as j → ∞. It follows the set E = {Xj} ∪ {X∗} is compact.
Substituting Kj−1 = (R1 +B⊺1Xj−1B1)−1B⊺1Xj−1(A −B2Lj−1) into the update rule, we get
Lj = −O−1j−1B−12 Xj−1(A −B1(R1 +B⊺1Xj−1B1)−1B⊺1Xj−1A).
By Lemma 5.3 (take X˜ =X∗ and X =Xj and note VK∗,L∗ = 0),
X∗ −Xj ⪯ ∞∑
ν=0
(A⊺j )ν ((L∗ −Lj)⊺O∗(L∗ −Lj))Aνj ,
where
O∗ = R2 −B⊺2X∗B2 +B⊺2X∗B1(R1 +B⊺1X∗B1)−1B⊺1X∗B2.
It follows that,
g(L∗) − g(Lj) ≤ Tr(Y∗(L∗ −Lj)⊺O∗(L∗ −Lj))
≤ λn(Y∗)λn(O∗)Tr((L∗ −Lj)⊺(L∗ −Lj)).
We observe
L∗ −Lj = −O−1∗ B⊺2X∗(A −B1(R1 +B⊺1X∗B1)−1B⊺1X∗A) +O−1j−1B⊺2Xj−1(A −B1(R1 +B⊺1Xj−1B1)−1B⊺1Xj−1A),
and further, note that the map φ given by
X ↦ −O−1X B⊺2X (A −B1(R1 +B⊺1XB1)−1B⊺1XA)
is smooth where,
OX = R2 −B⊺2XB2 +B⊺2XB1(R1 +B⊺1XB1)−1B⊺1XB2.
So over the compact set E , we can find a Lipschitz constant β of φ, namely, for every X,X ′ ∈ E , we
have ∥φ(X) − φ(X ′)∥F ≤ β∥X −X ′∥F . Then
∥L∗ −Lj∥2F = ∥φ(X∗) − φ(Xj)∥2F ≤ β2∥X∗ −Xj−1∥2F .
Hence
g(L∗) − g(Lj) ≤ c∥X∗ −Xj−1∥2F ≤ q (g(L∗) − g(Lj−1))2 ,
where c, q > 0 are constants.
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7 Policy Gradient Algorithms for Solving K ← argminK f(K,L)
In this section, we describe how we can use policy gradient based oracles to solve the minimization
problem for fixed L. If the iterates Q −Lj⊺R2Lj were positive definite, policy based updates, e.g.,
gradient descent, natural gradient descent and quasi-Newton iterations for standard LQR problem
as treated in [FGKM18] [BMFM19], could be adopted. Then the oracle OK can be constructed
by repeatedly performing the procedure to the desired precision. However, there are no guarantees
that this condition would be valid in the LQ dynamic game setup. We shall prove that with
the assumption that there exists a maximal stabilizing solution to the algebraic Riccati equation,
gradient descent (respectively, natural gradient descent and quasi-Newton) converges to the maximal
solution of the ARE at a linear (respectively, linear and quadratic) rate. In this direction, recall
that the gradient, natural gradient and quasi-Newton directions for fixed L are given by,
∇Kf(K,L) = 2(R1K −B⊺1XAK,L)Y =: g(K),
Nf,K(K,L) = 2(R1K −B⊺1XAK,L) =: n(K),
qNf,K(K,L) = 2(R1 +B⊺1XB1)−1(R1K −B⊺1XAK,L) =: qn(K).
We first provide the convergence analysis for the case of natural gradient descent.
Theorem 7.1 (Natural Gradient Analysis). Suppose that with fixed L, the ARE
(A −B2L)⊺X(A −B2L) −X + (A −B2L)⊺XB1(R1 +B⊺1XB1)−1B⊺1X(A −B2L) +Q −L⊺R2L = 0,
has a maximal stabilizing solution X+. Then the update rule,
Mi+1 =Mi − 1
2λn(R1 +B⊺1XiB1)2(R1Mi −B⊺1Xi(A −B2L −B1Mi)),
where Xi solves the Lyapunov equation
(A −B2L −B1Mi)⊺Xi +Xi(A −B2Lj −B1Mi) +Q −L⊺R2L +K⊺i R1Ki = 0,
converges linearly to K+ provided M0 ∈ SL. That is,
∥Mi −M∗∥2F ≤ qi∥M0 −M∗∥2F ,
for some q ∈ (0,1).
Remark 7.2. The difference between above theorem and the standard results treated in [FGKM18,
BMFM19] is that we are not assuming Q to be positive definite. Mind that in the above problem, the
matrix Q−L⊺jR2Lj corresponding to the penalization on states in the standard LQR, can be indefinite
in our sequential algorithms. The one step progression would follow from Theorem in [BMFM19].
However, the important difference is that the cost function is no longer coercive, requiring a separate
analysis for establishing the stability of the iterates.14
Proof. The analysis in [BMFM19] on the one-step progression of the natural gradient descent holds
here and thus the convergence rate would remain the same if we can prove that the iterates remain
stabilizing.
14We note that stability of the iterates in natural gradient update was not explicitly shown in [FGKM18]. Some
of the perturbation arguments for gradient descent in [FGKM18] can however be applied to argue for this property.
Such an argument would however rely on the strict positivity of the minimum eigenvalue of Q.
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By induction, it suffices to argue that with the chosen stepsize, Mi is stabilizing provided that
Mi−1 is. Consider the ray {Mt =Mi−1−tn(Mi−1) ∶ t ≥ 0}. Note that by openness of S and continuity
of eigenvalues, there is a maximal interval [0, ζ) such thatMi−1+tn(Mi−1) is stabilizing for t ∈ [0, ζ)
and Mi−1 + ζn(Mi−1) is marginally stabilizing. Now suppose that ζ ≤ 12λn(R1+B⊺1Xi−1B1) and take a
sequence tl ∈ [0, ζ) such that tl → ζ. Consider the sequence of value matrices {Xtl} and denote byL as the set of all limit points of {Xtj}. Note that L is nonempty since the sequence is bounded by
X+ ⪯Xtl ⪯Xi−1 for every tl.
15 By continuity, any Z ∈ L solves,
(A −B1Mζ −B2L)⊺Z(A −B1Mζ −B2L) −Z +Q −L⊺R2L +M⊺ζ R1Mζ = 0.
But this is a contradiction, since by the Comparison Lemma 5.1, we have
(A −B1Mζ −B2L)⊺(Z −X+)(A −B1Mζ −B2L) − (Z −X+) + (Mζ −K+)⊺R1(Mζ −K+) = 0.
Suppose that (λ, v) is the eigenvalue-eigenvector pair of A −B1Mζ −B2L1 such that (A −B1Mζ −
B2Lj)v = λv and ∣λ∣ = 1. Then as Z−X+ ⪰ 0, we would have Mζv =K+v. But this is a contradiction
to the assumption that K+ is a stabilizing solution. Hence {Xi} is a monotonically non-increasing
sequence bounded below by X+. As such, the sequence of iterates {Mi} would converge linearly to
K+ following the arguments in [BMFM19].
We mention that the above stability argument can be applied for the sequence generated by
the quasi-Newton iteration as well. The quadratic convergence rate for such a sequence would then
follow from the proof in [BMFM19].
Theorem 7.3 (Quasi-Newton Analysis). Suppose that with a fixed L, the ARE
(A −B2L)⊺X(A −B2L) −X + (A −B2L)⊺XB1(R1 +B⊺1XB1)−1B⊺1X(A −B2L) +Q −L⊺R2L = 0,
has a maximal stabilizing solution X+. Then the update rule
Mi+1 =Mi − 1
2
2(R1 +B⊺1XiB1)−1(R1Mi −B⊺1Xi(A −B2L −B1Mi)),
where Xi solves the Lyapunov equation
(A −B2Lj −B1Mi)⊺Xi +Xi(A −B2Lj −B1Mi) +Q −L⊺jR2Lj +K⊺i R1Ki = 0,
converges quadratically to K+ provided M0 ∈ S. That is,
∥Mi −M∗∥F ≤ q∥M0 −M∗∥2F ,
for some q > 0.
The gradient policy analysis requires more work since the stepsize developed in [BMFM19]
involves the smallest eigenvalue λ1(Q). However by carefully replacing “λ1(Q) related quantities”
in [BMFM19], one can still prove the global linear convergence rate as follows.
15Note that it is not guaranteed that Xtj is convergent. The limit points are also not necessarily well-ordered in
the ordering induced by the p.s.d. cone.
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Theorem 7.4 (Gradient Analysis). Suppose that with a fixed L, the ARE
(A −B2L)⊺X(A −B2L) −X + (A −B2L)⊺XB1(R1 +B⊺1XB1)−1B⊺1X(A −B2L) +Q −L⊺R2L = 0,
has a maximal stabilizing solution X+. Then the update rule
Mi+1 =Mi − ηi2(R1Mi −B⊺1Xi(A −B2L −B1Mi))YMi,L,
where Xi solves the Lyapunov equation
(A −B2Lj −B1Mi)⊺Xi +Xi(A −B2Lj −B1Mi) +Q −L⊺jR2Lj +K⊺i R1Ki = 0,
converges linearly to K+ provided M0 ∈ S. That is,
∥Mi −M∗∥2F ≤ qi∥M0 −M∗∥2F ,
for some q ∈ (0,1).
The convergence analysis of gradient policy follows closely of the idea presented in [BMFM19].
In [BMFM19], the compactness of sublevel sets was used to devise the stepsize rule to guarantee a
sufficient decrease in the cost and stability of the iterates. The proof of compactness in [BMFM19]
however, relies on the positive definiteness of Q − L⊺jR2Lj .16 It is also not valid to assume that
the function is coercive. But, we can show that an analogous strategy adopted in [BMFM19] can
be employed to derive a suitable stepsize for the game setup. The details analysis are defered to
Appendix B.
8 Comments on Adopting Gradient Polices for L
Gradient policy update for LQ games has been discussed in [ZYB19], where a projection step is
required in updating the policy L. In particular, in [ZYB19], it has been stated that a projection
step onto the set Ω = {L ∶ Q − L⊺R2L ⪰ 0} would guarantee that L is stabilizing. The key issue
however is the stabilizability of (A −B2L,B1); as such, it is not valid to assume that every L ∈ Ω
would yield a stabilizable pair (A−B2L,B1). In fact, the approach adopted in our work would not
work for gradient policy either, as we rely on a monotonicity property of the corresponding value
matrix; gradient policy would only decrease the cost function without any guarantees to decrease
the value matrix (with respect to the p.s.d. ordering). If we assume that the Nash equilibrium
L∗ ∈ Ω and could guarantee that (A − B2Lj ,B1) is stabilizable, then it would be warranted that
f(K,Lj) has a unique minimizer for every Lj; in this case, the approach adopted in this paper
would provide a simpler proof for convergence of gradient policies for LQ games.
9 Switching the Leader in the Sequential Algorithms
We shall demonstrate in this section if the condition a2 in the assumption holds, it might not be
guaranteed that g(L) is differentiable in a neighborhood of L∗. In this case, however, choosing the
leader to be player K would converge. The analysis would proceed in a similar manner. First, we
observe that we can define a value function,
h(K) = sup
L∈SK
f(K,L).
Following virtually the same argument, we can the establish the following.
16Or the observability of (Q −L⊺jR2Lj ,A).
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Proposition 9.1. Suppose that U ⊆ dom(h) is an open set such that for every K ∈ U , there is a
unique maximizer of f(K,L) over L. Then h(L) is differentiable and the gradient is given by
∇h(K) = ∇Kf(K,LK), where LK = argmax
L∈SK
f(K,L).
The algorithm for player K using natural gradient policy can be described similarly to Algo-
rithm 1.
Algorithm 3 Natural Gradient Policy for LQ Game
1: Initialize K0 such that (A −B1K0,B2) is stabilizable and the DARE
(A −B1K0)Z(A −B1K0) −Q −K⊺0R1K0 − (A −B1K0)⊺ZB2(R2 +B⊺2ZB2)−1B⊺2Z(A −B1K0) = Z.
has a maximal symmetric solution Z+ with R2 +B⊺2Z+B2 ≻ 0.
2: if j ≥ 1 then
3: Set: Lj−1 ← argmaxL f(Kj−1,L).
4: Set: Kj =Kj−1 − ηjNh(Lj) ≡Kj−1 − ηjNf,K(Kj−1,Lj−1).
5: end if
We observe that for fixed K ′, if L′ is the unique stabilizing maximizer of f(K ′,L) over L, then
substituting ∇Lf(K ′,L′) = 0 into the Lyapunov matrix equation, L′ solves the following ARE,
(A −B1K ′)Z(A −B1K ′) +Q +K ′⊺R1K ′ − (A −B1K ′)⊺ZB2(−R2 +B⊺2ZB2)−1B⊺2Z(A −B1K ′) = Z.(11)
To utilize the theory developed in standard ARE, which concerns a minimization problem, we may
consider following modification:
(A −B1K ′)W (A −B1K ′) −Q −K ′⊺R1K ′ − (A −B1K ′)⊺WB2(R2 +B⊺2WB2)−1B⊺2W (A −B1K ′) =W.(12)
We observe that if W solves (12), then −W solves (11). Now the analysis can be done almost in
parallel.
Lemma 9.2. Suppose that Lj−1 is the unique stabilizing maximizer of f(Kj−1,L), i.e., Lj−1 =
argminL f(Kj−1,L). Putting ∆ =XKj−1,Lj−1 and
Oj−1 = R1 +B⊺1∆B1 +B⊺1∆B2(R2 −B⊺2∆B2)−1B⊺2∆B1,
with stepsize ηj−1 ≤ 1λn(Oj−1) , we then have,
a. (A −B1Kj,B2) is stabilizable.
b. f(Kj ,L) is bounded above over L and there exists a unique stabilizing maximizer Lj, namely(Kj ,Lj) is a stabilizing pair.
c. Putting Λ =XKj ,Lj , we have
∆ −Λ ⪰ A⊺Kj ,Lj(∆ −Λ)AKj ,Lj +U⊺Kj−1,Lj−1 (−4ηj−1I + 4η2jOj−1)UKj−1,Lj−1 .
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Proof. The proof proceeds similarly to Lemma 5.4. Indeed, putting ∆˜ = −∆ and Λ˜ = −Λ, we observe
∆˜ and Λ˜ solves the DARE (12) and also note the DARE (12) has the same form with the DARE
considered in Lemma 5.4. Further, note that the update rule is equivalent to
Kj =Kj−1 − ηj−12(R1Kj−1 −B⊺1∆AKj−1,Lj−1) =Kj−1 − ηj−12(R1Kj−1 +B⊺1 ∆˜AKj−1,Lj−1)
=Kj−1 + 2ηj−1(−R1Kj−1 −B⊺1 ∆˜AKj−1,Lj−1).
In view of these observations, by the same machinery we employed in Lemma 5.4, we conclude
Λ˜ − ∆˜ ⪰ A⊺Kj ,Lj(Λ˜ − ∆˜)AKj ,Lj + U˜⊺Kj−1,Lj−1 (4ηj−1I − 4η2j O˜j−1) U˜Kj−1,Lj−1 ,
where
U˜Kj−1,Lj−1 = −R1Kj−1 −B⊺∆˜AKj−1,Lj−1 ,
O˜j−1 = R1 −B⊺1 ∆˜B1 +B⊺1 ∆˜B2(R2 +B⊺2 ∆˜B2)−1B⊺2 ∆˜B1.
It thus follows that,
−Λ +∆ ⪰ A⊺Kj ,Lj(∆ −Λ)AKj ,Lj +U⊺Kj−1,Lj−1 (−4ηj−1I + 4η2jOj−1)UKj−1,Lj−1 .
Now it is straightforward to conclude the sublinear convergence rate of Algorithm 3.
Lemma 9.3. Suppose {Kj} are the iterates generated by Algorithm 3. Then we have
∞
∑
j=0
Nh(Kj) ≤ η (h(K0) − h(K∗)) ,
where η > 0 is some positive number.
The analysis of quasi-Newton method with K as the leader proceeds in a similar manner as
Algorithm 2; as such we omit the details here.
10 Concluding Remarks
The papers considers sequential policy-based algorithms for LQ dynamic games. We prove global
convergence of several mixed-policy algorithms as well as identifying the role of control theoretic
constructs in their analysis. Moreover, we have clarified a number of intricate issues pertaining to
stabilization for LQ games and indefinite cost structure, while removing restrictive assumptions and
circumventing the projection step.
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Appendix
A Hessian of g(L)
In this section, we compute the Hessian of g(L) at a point of differentiation of L0. Indeed, we shall
assume stronger assumptions of L0: there is a unique stabilizing minimizer of f(K,L0) over L0,
denoted by K0. Throughout the section, we denote A0 = A −B1K0 −B2L0. Note, by assumption
the DARE is solvable
(A −B2L0)⊺X(A −B2L0) +Q −L⊺0R2L0 + (A −B2L0)⊺XB1(R1 +B⊺1XB1)−1B⊺1X(A −B2L0) =X,
and the maximal solution X0 is stabilizing, i.e., K0 = (R1+B⊺1X0B1)−1B⊺1X(A−B2L0) is stabilizing
the system (A −B2L0,B1). As we have noted, the gradient of g(L0) is given by
∇g(L0) = 2(−R2L0 −B⊺2X0(A −B2L0 −B1K0))Y0,
where Y0 is the solution to the Lyapunov matrix equation
A0Y A
⊺
0 +Σ = Y.
We now compute the Fréchet derivative of φ(L0) = 2(−R2L0 −B⊺2X0A0). Note φ ∶ Rm2×n → Rm2×n,
the Fréchet derivative Dφ(L0) is a bounded linear map in L(Rm2×n,Rm2×n). So the action of
Dφ(L0) at any E ∈ Rm1×n, denoted by Dφ(L0)[E] =:D ∈ Rm2×n is given by
D = 2(−R2E −B⊺2X ′0(E)(A −B2L0 −B1K0) −B⊺2X0(−B2E) −B⊺2X0(−B2K ′0(E))),
where X ′0(E) ∈ Rn×n (respectively, K ′0(E)) is the action of the Fréchet derivative ofX0 (respectively,
K0) with respect to L0. Here we concern X0,K0 as maps of L. Now X
′
0(E) satisfies
A⊺0X
′
0(E)A0 −X ′0(E) −E⊺R2L0 −L⊺0R2E +K ′0(E)⊺R1K0 +K⊺0R1K ′0(E)−(B2E +B1K ′0(E))⊺X0A0 −A⊺0X0(B1K ′0(E) +B2E) = 0.
Noting R1K0 −B⊺1X0A0 = 0, we have X ′0(E) is the solution to the following Lyapunov equation
A⊺0X
′
0(E)A0 −X ′0(E) −E⊺(R2L0 +B⊺2X0A0) −L⊺0(R2E +A⊺0X0B2E) = 0.
As A0 is Schur, the solution exists and is unique
X ′0(E) = ∞∑
j=0
(A⊺0)j[−E⊺(R2L0 +B⊺2X0A0) −L⊺0(R2E +A⊺0X0B2E)]Aj0.
Similarly, we may compute
K ′0(E) = (R1 +B⊺1X0B1)−1B⊺1X0(−B2E) + (R1 +B1X0B1)−1B⊺1X ′0(E)(A −B2L0)
+ (R1 +B⊺1X0B1)−1B⊺1X ′0(E)B1(R1 +B⊺1X0B1)−1B⊺1X0(A −B2L0),
and
Y ′0(E) = ∞∑
j=0
A
j
0
[A0Y0(−B2E)⊺ + (−B2E)Y0A⊺0] (A⊺0)j .
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Combining the computations, we have the action of the Hessian is given by
⟨∇2g(L)E,E⟩ = 2⟨−R2 +B⊺2X0B2 −B⊺2X0B1(R1 +B⊺1X0B1)−1B⊺1X0B2)E,E⟩
+ 2⟨−B⊺2X ′0(E)A0 −B⊺2X0B1(R1 +B1X0B1)−1B⊺1X ′0(E)(A −B2L0),E⟩
+ 2⟨B⊺2X0B1(R1 +B⊺1X0B1)−1B⊺1X ′0(E)B1(R1 +B⊺1X0B1)−1B⊺1X0(A −B2L0),E⟩+ 2⟨(−R2L0 −B⊺2X0A0)Y ′0(E),E⟩
It is instructive to note that at L∗, X
′
∗(E) = 0 since −R2L∗ −B⊺2X∗A∗ = 0. So the action of Hessian
at L∗ is given by
∇2g(L∗)[E,E] = ⟨(−R2 +B⊺2X0B2 −B⊺2X0B1(R1 +B⊺1X0B1)−1B⊺1X0B2))EY0,E⟩.
That is, ∇2g(L∗) is a positive definite operator by condition (a1) in the assumption. Hence, −g(L)
is locally strongly convex in a convex neighborhood.
Remark A.1. If we ignore the formality, the above computation is nothing but a linear approxima-
tion.
B Gradient Policy Analysis for Nonstandard LQR
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 7.4. As it was pointed out previously, the strategy
for devising a stepsize guaranteeing linear convergence for the LQ game setup is similar to the one
presented in [BMFM19]. However, the convergence analysis for the game setup is more involved as
one can not estimate the needed quantities using the current function values due to the indefiniteness
of the term Q − L⊺R2L. However, as we will show, a perturbation bound would circumvent this
issue and allows deriving the required stepsize.
In order to simplify the notation, let
ψ(M) := f(M,L), U = R1M −B⊺1X(A −B2L −B1M), AM = A −B2L −B1M.
Note that in our analysis L is always fixed; we also adopt the notation AL := A −B2L.
If Mη = A −B2L −B1(M − η2UY ) is stabilizing,
ψ(M) − ψ(Mη) = 4ηTr (U⊺U(Y Y (η) − ηaY YηY )) ,
where a = λn(R1 +B⊺1MB1), and Y (η) solves the Lyapunov matrix equation
(A −B2L −B1Mη)⊺Y (η)(A −B2L −B1Mη) +Σ = Y (η).
Now define a univariate function φ as,
φ(η) = Tr (U⊺U(Y Y (η) − ηaY YηY )) .
We observe that φ(η) is well-defined locally around 0 by openness of the set SL.17 Further, observe
that φ(0) > 0 if the gradient does not vanish at M . Now our goal is to characterize a step size such
that φ(η) > 0. In this direction, we first observe a perturbation bound on Y (η).
17φ is well-defined only if A −B2L −B1Mη is Schur.
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Proposition B.1. Putting µ1 = ∥Y ∥2∥B1UY ∥22/λ1(Σ) and µ2 = ∥Y ∥2∥B1UY ∥2∥A −B2L∥2/λ1(Σ),
if we let
η0 =
√
1 + µ22
µ1
2
√
µ1
− µ2
2µ1
,
and supposing that Aη = A −B2L −B1Mη is Schur stable for every η ≤ η0, then for all η ≤ η0,
∥Y (η)∥2 ≤ β0∥Y ∥2,
where β0 = 11−4µ1η20−4µ2η0
> 0.
Proof. Taking the difference of the corresponding Lyapunov matrix equations, we have
Y (η) − Y − (AL −B1M)(Y (η) − Y )(AL −B1M)⊺ = ALY (η)2η(B1UY )⊺ + 2ηB1UY Y (η)AL
+ 4η2B1UY Y (η)(B1UY )⊺
⪯ ∥Yη∥2 (4η∥B1UY ∥2∥AL∥ + 4η2∥B1UY ∥22) I
⪯ ∥Yη∥2 (4η∥B1UY ∥2∥AL∥ + 4η2∥B1UY ∥22) Σ
λ1(Σ) .
It thus follows that,
Yη − Y ⪯ ∥Yη∥2 (4η∥B1UY ∥2∥AL∥ + 4η2∥B1UY ∥22)
λ1(Σ) Y.
Hence,
∥Yη∥2 ⎛⎝1 − ∥Y ∥2 (4η∥B1UY ∥2∥AL∥ + 4η
2∥B1UY ∥22)
λ1(Σ) ⎞⎠ ≤ ∥Y ∥2.
The proof is completed by a direct computation and noting that 1/β0 = 1 − µ1η20 − 4µ2η0 > 0 with
the choice of η0 and for every η ≤ η0,
1 − 4µ1η2 − 4µ2η ≥ 1 − 4µ1η20 − 4µ2η0.
We now present an important result for our analysis. The basic idea of this lemma is as follows:
if [0, c) is the largest interval such that At is Schur stable for every t ∈ [0, c) and Ac is marginally
Schur stable,18 then we can find a number c0 < c such that ψ(Ms) ≤ ψ(M) for every s ∈ [0, c0].
Lemma B.2. Let c be the largest real positive number such that At is Schur stable for every t ∈ [0, c)
and Ac is marginally Schur stable
19. Let
a1 = aβ0λn(Y ) + 4∥U∥2β0[λn(Y )]2,
a2 = a4∥U∥2β0[λn(Y )]2;
18Such a c exists by the openness of the set of stabilizing gains.
19Here we have assumed that c is not +∞. Of course, if c = +∞, then any stepsize would remain stabilizing.
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then with
η1 ≤min(c − ε, η0, c0),
where ε > 0 is an arbitrary positive real number and
c0 <
¿ÁÁÀ 1
a2
+ a21
4a2
2
− a2
2a1
,
one has φ(η1) ≥ 0.
Proof. The computations follow a similar method used in [BMFM19] by replacing the estimate of
Y (θ) by the bound in the above proposition (see details in Lemma 5.5 in [BMFM19]).
If one could explicitly compute the c in the above result, then a deterministic choice of stepsize
could be chosen; however, this is not feasible. Fortunately, we can show that c > min(η0, c0). This
would then imply that one can choose the stepsize η =min(η0, c0).
Theorem B.3. With the stepsize η =min(η0, c0), Mη remains stabilizing and φ(η) ≥ 0.
Proof. Let η = min(η0, c0). It suffices to prove that for every t ∈ [0, η], At is Schur stabilizing and
φ(t) ≥ 0. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that this is not the case. Then by continuity
of eigenvalues, there exists a number η′ ≤ η such that As is stabilizing for every s ∈ [0, η′) and Mη′
is stabilizing. If this is the case, the choice of η0, c0 guarantees that for every s ∈ [0, η′), φ(s) is
well-defined and φ(s) ≥ 0. Now take a sequence ti → η′ and consider the corresponding sequence of
value matrices {Xti}. Note that the sequence of function values Tr(XtiΣ) satisfies,
Tr(X+Σ) ≤ Tr(XtiΣ) ≤ Tr(XΣ),
since φ(t) ≥ 0. But this implies that {Xti} is a bounded sequence (note that the above inequality
on function values does not guarantee the boundedness of the sequence; it is crucial that Xti ⪰X
+).
Hence by a similar argument adopted in the proof of Theorem 7.1, these observations establish a
contradiction, and as such, the proposed stepsize guarantees stabilization.
It is now straightforward to conclude the convergence rate.
C A Useful Control Theoretic Observation
In the proof to Lemma 5.4 and 6.1, we have used the fact that the set {L ∶ (A−B2L,B1) is stabilizable}
is open; here is the justification.
Proposition C.1. Suppose A ∈ Rn×n, B1 ∈ Rn×m1 and B2 ∈ Rn×m2 are fixed. Then the set
L = {L ∈ Rm2×n ∶ (A −B2L,B1) is stabilizable}
is open in Rm2×n.
Proof. Recall a pair (A −B2L,B1) is stabilizable if and only if there exists some F ∈ Rm1×n such
that A −B2L −B1F is Schur. So (A −B2L,B1) is stabilizable if and only if there exists X ≻ 0 and
F ∈ Rm1×n such that (A −B2L −B1F )⊺X(A −B2L −B1F ) −X ≺ 0.
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Now consider the map ψ ∶ S++n ×Rm2×n ×Rm1×n → R by
(X,L,F ) ↦ (A −B2L −B1F )⊺X(A −B2L −B1F ) −X
↦ λmax ((A −B2L −B1F )⊺X(A −B2L −B1F ) −X) .
The map ψ is continuous as it is a composition of continuous maps. It thus follows that ψ−1((−∞,0))
is open. We now observe that L ≡ π2(ψ−1(−∞,0)) where π2 is the projection onto the second
coordinate. Since projection map is open map20, L is open.
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